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CIVIL, POLITICAL, AND SOCIAL
EQUALITY AFTER LINCOLN:
A PARADIGM AND A PROBLEMATIC
KATE MASUR *
When it comes to Abraham Lincoln and race, there are few words
more famous than the future president’s 1858 assertion that he had “no
purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and
1
the black races.” The statement cannot be discounted as merely an
artifact of his intense struggle against Stephen Douglas for a seat in the
U.S. Senate. To the contrary, in a standalone speech in Peoria four
years earlier, Lincoln had said his “own feelings” did not admit of
2
making former slaves “politically and socially our equals.” At the same
time, of course, Lincoln also consistently argued for certain kinds of
racial equality. As he said in Columbus, Ohio, in 1859, “there is no
reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights
enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life,
3
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”
My purpose here is not to assess whether Lincoln was racist, or how
racist. Nor is it to chart how his own views on equality changed over the
course of the Civil War. Rather, it is to reflect on the meanings of the
separate categories of equality that Lincoln mentioned—natural (or
civil), political, and social—as they took shape after his death. The
historian James Oakes has recently made the interesting argument that
Lincoln separated natural and civil rights from political and social ones
because he believed the federal government had power to enforce civil

* Assistant Professor of History, Northwestern University.
1. First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Aug. 21,
1858, reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1, 16 (Roy P. Basler
et al. eds., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS].
2. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, ILL. J., Oct. 21, 23–28, 1854, reprinted in
2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 247, 256.
3. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Columbus, Ohio, ILL. STATE J., Sept. 24, 1859, reprinted
in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 400, 402. See also Sixth Debate with Stephen A.
Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Oct. 13, 1858, reprinted in 3 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 1, at 245, 248–49 (illustrating Lincoln’s view regarding equality); Fourth
Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Charleston, Illinois, CHI. PRESS & TRIB., Sept. 18, 1858,
reprinted in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 1, at 145, 145–46 (same).
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rights but not to regulate political or “social” equality. 4 I agree with
Oakes’s contention that Lincoln had considerable respect for the
5
conventional prerogatives of states. And yet, I argue, it was not only
the proper relationship between the federal government and the states
that was at issue when people of the era distinguished between civil,
political, and social equality. The categories of equality that Lincoln
evoked when talking about African Americans’ future in the United
States were, in fact, malleable and unstable in the early postwar years.
Defining their content was one of the central projects of
6
Reconstruction.
Much of the evidence used in this paper emerged during my research
7
on race and equality in Civil War-era Washington, D.C. The District of
Columbia is an excellent place to study political ideas apart from
federalism because Congress has exclusive jurisdiction there. Time and
again after the Civil War, congressional debates about policy toward the
District dealt in sweeping terms with the crucial question of what racial
equality would mean in the reconstructed nation.
Postwar Republicans shared with Lincoln a broad consensus that
African Americans should enjoy civil equality with whites. Republicans
generally agreed that civil equality meant equal treatment by laws and,
8
implicitly, security of property. Lincoln had said that he believed in the
natural equality of black and white people. The natural rights he
mentioned, the ones described in the Declaration of Independence as
4. James Oakes, Natural Rights, Citizenship Rights, States’ Rights, and Black Rights:
Another Look at Lincoln and Race, in OUR LINCOLN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LINCOLN AND
HIS WORLD 109, 109–34 (Eric Foner ed., 2008).
5. See id. at 125–34.
6. Recent works on contemporary categories of equality include JANE DAILEY, BEFORE
JIM CROW: THE POLITICS OF RACE IN POSTEMANCIPATION VIRGINIA 85–93 (2000);
Elizabeth Dale, “Social Equality Does Not Exist among Themselves, nor among Us”: Baylies
vs. Curry and Civil Rights in Chicago, 1888, 102 AM. HIST. REV. 311 (1997); Nell Irvin
Painter, “Social Equality,” Miscegenation, Labor, and Power, in THE EVOLUTION OF
SOUTHERN CULTURE 47 (Numan V. Bartley ed., 1988); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE
AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 153–73 (1999); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE
DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR
NORTH, 1865–1901, at 122–55 (2001); Hannah Rosen, The Rhetoric of Miscegenation and the
Reconstruction of Race: Debating Marriage, Sex, and Citizenship in Postemancipation
Arkansas, in GENDER AND SLAVE EMANCIPATION IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 289 (Pamela
Scully & Diana Paton eds., 2005); Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the
Conceptual Roots of the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777 (2008).
7. KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE
STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2010).
8. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 290–91 (2d ed. 1995).
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the rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” were the basis
for this concept of civil rights. That is, natural rights, when translated
into the world of laws and men, were civil rights, which were also often
considered fundamental rights.
Making policy for the capital,
Republicans in Congress put the principle of civil equality into practice
in the spring of 1862, first by abolishing slavery and then, weeks later, by
overturning the antebellum black codes, which had created separate
9
categories of crime for blacks and whites.
Lincoln and many other moderate Republicans had long
distinguished between civil equality and political equality, supporting
10
But African-American activists and
the former but not the latter.
some white radical Republicans insisted on a far more expansive vision
of fundamental equality before the law. Many argued that civil equality
should include the vote, which they considered a fundamental right
11
whose origins, like the origins of other civil rights, were in natural law.
Many also believed the principle of civil equality to require that African
Americans have equal access to public schools, common carriers (such
as streetcars, railroads, and steamers), and other public
12
In part because of disagreements among
accommodations.
Republicans over the definition of civil rights, Congress’s two major
statements about civil rights in 1866—the Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment—left considerable ambiguity about the
13
boundaries of federally enforceable civil rights.
During the postwar debate about equality, whenever radicals pushed
the bounds of racial equality—for example, by demanding the equal
right to vote, hold office, or enjoy access to public schools or public
accommodations—opponents charged them with seeking something that
just about everyone professed to despise: social equality. Unlike the
terms “civil equality” and “political equality,” “social equality” had no
9. See Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376; Act of May 21, 1862, ch. 83, 12 Stat. 407.
10. FONER, supra note 8, at 290–91; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary
Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 881–
83 (1986).
11. MASUR, supra note 7, at 132–33; see also id. at 7–8; Donald G. Nieman, The
Language of Liberation: African Americans and Equalitarian Constitutionalism, 1830–1950, in
THE CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE: CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE NINETEENTHCENTURY EXPERIENCE 67–81 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992); ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 58,
88–89, 96–98 (2000).
12. MASUR, supra note 7, at 105, 164–65, 227–30.
13. Kaczorowski, supra note 10, at 926; Earl Maltz, The Civil Rights Act and the Civil
Rights Cases: Congress, Court, and Constitution, 44 FLA. L. REV. 605, 620–22 (1992).
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true content, no concrete existence. Instead, people used social equality
as a gloss for inappropriate government interference in whatever
relationships they believed should properly be considered private
matters of personal taste. Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson, for
example, argued in 1864 that a law forbidding racial discrimination on
14
Washington’s streetcars amounted to a social-equality measure.
Protection of African Americans’ “life and property” was acceptable, he
argued (alluding to natural or civil rights), but the government should
not intervene in matters of “political rights and social enjoyment,”
which had to do with the “preference on our part for the society of those
15
One conservative
whom we deem God has created our equals.”
newspaper insisted that Congress should not enfranchise black men in
16
the District because the vote was a “purely social question.”
When people mobilized the specter of social equality, they were not
merely distinguishing between rights that were fundamental and those
that were not, or between the proper scope of the federal government
and that of states or localities. They were also demarcating the spaces
where private preferences, not public policy, should reign. For example,
in 1869, when a Republican-dominated Washington City Council passed
a law barring racial discrimination in the city’s theaters and restaurants,
the Republican Chicago Tribune derided it, insisting that hotels and
theaters “offer entertainments and amusement merely,” and that the
“only function the government has in relation to them is to preserve
17
order, not to regulate the class of people who shall go to them.”
Meanwhile, a moderate Republican newspaper in Washington predicted
that few “colored people will avail themselves of the privileges given
them by the law,” since they “are acquiring a good deal of self-respect,
and are not disposed to thrust themselves, socially, where they are not
18
wanted.”
14. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1156–57 (1864).
15. Id. at 1157.
16. Editorial, NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 11, 1866, at 2.
17. Editorial, The Admission of Colored People to Places of Amusement, EVENING
STAR (Wash., D.C.), June 17, 1869, at 2 (quoting the Tribune).
18. Editorial, Equality at Places of Amusement, EVENING STAR (Wash., D.C.), June 7,
1869, at 2 (emphasis added). See also The Colored Citizen, WORLD (N.Y.), June 5, 1869, at 1;
How the Negroes Will Legislate, WORLD (N.Y.), June 14, 1869, at 5; Social Equality, WORLD
(N.Y.), Dec. 1, 1869, at 3; Editorial, WASH. EXPRESS, July 20, 1869, at 1; Phineas Indritz, Post
Civil War Ordinances Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in the District of Columbia, 42 GEO.
L.J. 179, 187–89 (1954). For the traditional role of local governments in chartering and
regulating corporations, see William J. Novak, The American Law of Association: The Legal–
Political Construction of Civil Society, 15 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 163, 180–82 (2001).
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When Democrats and Republican moderates charged African
Americans who demanded access to theretofore-white-only institutions
with seeking dreaded “social equality,” they were offering an expansive
vision of the private realm and a concomitantly narrow vision of the
public. Indeed, the genius or power of the discourse of social equality
was that it evoked a large and heterogeneous realm—whether
considered social, private, or sociable—where Americans had long
imagined that they had liberty to choose with whom to associate.
Before the Civil War, the author of an antebellum New York society
manual, reflecting on the differences between democracy in political life
and exclusivity in “society,” had stated that political equality “‘does not
19
The author continued: “‘None are
extend to the drawing-room.’”
excluded from the highest councils of the nation, but it does not follow
20
that all can enter into the highest ranks of society.’” The social realm
was defined by personal choice and hierarchy, and it remained cordoned
off from the political arena, in which white men were formally equal.
So sacrosanct was the social realm that Reconstruction radicals
typically attempted to deny that they sought social equality, even as they
argued for an expansive definition of equality before the law that
included equal rights to attend public schools and to use public
accommodations.
For example, Washington’s radical Republican
Chronicle used images of two well-known New York neighborhoods to
dramatize the distinction between political equality, which that paper
supported, and social equality, which it did not. “Fifth avenue and the
Five Points are politically equal,” an editorial commented, “but in a
social point of view they are as far removed from each other as the
21
poles.”
Disavowing an interest in social equality, radicals sought to
emphasize the publicness of institutions such as public schools and
public accommodations, arguing that these were institutions regulated
by government and obligated to serve a public that now included not
only whites but African Americans as well. For example, in an 1872
debate over Senator Charles Sumner’s supplemental Civil Rights Act,
19. SVEN BECKERT, THE MONIED METROPOLIS: NEW YORK CITY AND THE
CONSOLIDATION OF THE AMERICAN BOURGEOISIE, 1850–1896, at 45 (2001) (quoting THE
LAWS OF ETIQUETTE OR, SHORT RULES AND REFLECTIONS FOR CONDUCT IN SOCIETY 10
(2d ed., Phila., Carey, Lea & Blanchard 1836)).
20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Editorial, Social Equality, DAILY MORNING CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2, 1865,
at 2. See also Editorial, Social Equality, DAILY MORNING CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 22,
1866, at 2.
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which proposed a federal ban on discrimination in public
accommodations, Senator Lot Morrill, a moderate Republican from
Maine, argued against the bill on grounds that it concerned “rights of a
22
strictly domiciliary character.” In response to Morrill’s use of the term
“domiciliary” to invoke the home and the private realm more generally,
black activist George T. Downing countered (in a letter that Charles
Sumner later read to the Senate):
A man’s private domicile is his own castle . . . . But the
public inn, the public or common school, the public place
of amusement, as well as common carriers, asking the
special protection of law, created through its action on
the plea and for the benefit of the public good, have no
such exclusive right as the citizen may rightfully claim
23
within his home . . . .
Morrill himself had argued that “equality before the law” was a
24
constitutional right, Downing pointed out. The Sumner bill simply
25
represented a codification of that reasoning.
Downing’s case was
cogent, and the Sumner bill would eventually pass. In the end, however,
such arguments for an expansive definition of the public realm—and for
a vision of constitutional equality that extended to public
accommodations—would fail.
An 1872 decision by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
illustrated the logic and institutional power of those who argued for an
expansive private realm in which racial discrimination could not be
prohibited by government. In a decision overturning a local public
accommodations law, the District’s highest court held that the municipal
government had stepped outside its bounds in forbidding racial
discrimination in restaurants, theaters, and other public
26
accommodations. In fact, the court concluded, “[t]he proprietor of a
hotel or restaurant was the proper judge of who should have either
refreshments or lodgings in his house, and no one could dispute his
27
The local court thus also rejected the
authority in that matter.”
argument, advanced both by Sumner and local black activists, that
22. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. App. 4 (1872).
23. George T. Downing, Letter to the Editor, DAILY MORNING CHRON. (Wash., D.C.),
Jan. 31, 1872, at 3. See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. App. 729 (1872).
24. See Downing, supra note 23, at 3.
25. See id.
26. See A Man’s House His Castle—Sebastian Aman’s Case Decided, DAILY MORNING
CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Dec. 7, 1872, at 4.
27. Id.
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licensed public accommodations were institutions of a different stature
from conventional private property. Rather, the judge’s use of the term
“house” to describe restaurants and inns signaled his conviction that
public accommodations were akin to private homes and that the law was
essentially a social equality measure.
United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1870s and 1880s
helped end the postwar debate about the content of the categories of
civil, political, and social equality. Most significantly, in 1883, the U.S.
Supreme Court would codify the distinction between the acceptable
rights outlined by the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the unacceptable
government incursions into private life mandated by the 1875 Civil
Rights Act. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court declared that the right
to racially equal access to public accommodations was not among the
28
“fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship.”
Any arenas not explicitly mentioned in the 1866 law, the Court held,
concerned “what may be called the social rights of men and races in the
29
The Court thus categorized access to public
community.”
accommodations as “social rights” that were, by definition, not
30
“fundamental.” The federalism piece of the reasoning was that only
local governments could decide how to regulate such “social rights of
men and races” (implying, for example, that Massachusetts could have
its public accommodations laws and Tennessee could have its Jim Crow
31
laws). But as we have seen, the power of the federal government was
not all that was at issue here. Also implicated was the question of where
Americans would fix the boundary between the realm of the state and
the realm of private interest.
Arguments against social equality—arguments that insisted on a
very broad definition of private relationships and a relatively narrow
vision of the public realm—were central to the architecture of twentiethcentury Jim Crow. “Perhaps nothing perplexes the outside observer
more than the popular term and the popular theory of ‘no social
32
equality,’” wrote the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in 1944.
Myrdal had been “made to feel from the start” of his research on the
“American dilemma” of race that social equality had “concrete

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY 586 (1944).
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implications and a central importance for the Negro problem in
33
America.” Yet he observed that its meaning was always “kept vague
34
and elusive, and the theory loose and ambiguous.” Myrdal wrote:
One moment [the theory] will be stretched to cover and
justify every form of social segregation and
discrimination, and, in addition, all the inequalities in
justice, politics and breadwinning. The next moment it
will be narrowed to express only the denial of close
personal intimacies and intermarriage. The very lack of
precision allows the notion of “no social equality” to
rationalize the rather illogical and wavering system of
35
color caste in America.
That powerful “notion,” which Myrdal found so central to twentiethcentury segregation, had its foundation in the Civil War-era debate
about racial equality. From the beginning, opponents of expansive
racial equality invoked “social equality” with the same opportunistic
inconsistency as they would in the mid-twentieth century.
When Abraham Lincoln said in 1858 that he believed that black and
white people had equal natural rights but that he did not support
political or social equality between the races, of course he could not
have imagined the Civil War’s dramatic impact on the nation. We
cannot know how Lincoln ultimately would have defined political and
social equality had he lived into the postwar period. What is clear,
however, is that the three categories of equality he invoked in the 1850s
represented not only a paradigm for thinking about equality, but also a
problematic. Before the war, no one needed to press Lincoln on exactly
what those categories would include or exclude, because the question of
the status of African Americans after emancipation was purely
hypothetical. After the war, however, it was an urgent matter of policy.
And after the war, the argument against “social equality” became a
powerful tool for those who sought to limit the period’s most egalitarian
aspirations.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.

